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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN FLUX:
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagn e des Bauxtes de Guinee
In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 1 the
Supreme Court upheld the use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
37(b) (2) (A) sanctions to impose personal jurisdiction on a defendant
who disobeyed court orders to submit to jurisdictional discovery. 2 Read
narrowly, Compagnie des Bauxtes holds that the jurisdictional use of rule
37(b)(2)(A) does not offend the fifth amendment due process clause.3
The Court, however, extended its discussion of jurisdictional due process
beyond the fifth amendment and implicated fourteenth amendment due
process. The Court's discussion appears inconsistent with recent four-
teenth amendment jurisdictional precedent and could have wide-rang-
ing effects on the jurisdiction of federal and state courts.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Due Process Limitations on the Exercise of Personal
Jurisdiction
A court must have personal jurisdiction over a defendant before
entering a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation in the plain-
tiff's favor.4 Both the federal Constitution 5 and restrictions emanating
1 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
2 The term "jurisdictional discovery" is used throughout this Note to describe discovery
of information relating to the question of personal jurisdiction.
3 Although the Court in Compagnie des Bauxites never expressly stated that it was apply-
ing a fifth amendment due process standard, this Note attempts to show that the Court did,
in fact, invoke such a standard. See infa notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
4 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978).
5 The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments form the primary
constitutional constraints on personal jurisdiction. Other provisions of the federal Constitu-
tion, however, also may limit personal jurisdiction. For example, in certain instances, the first
amendment may constitute a jurisdictional constraint. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Con-
nor, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966) ("First Amendment considerations surrounding the law
of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause than is necessary
in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tortious activity."); Environmental Research Int'l
v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813-14, 813 n.1 1 (D.C. 1976) (basing jurisdic-
tional finding on defendant's visits to forum, when such visits were made solely to consult
with government officials, might violate first amendment right to petition government for
redress of grievances). The commerce clause may also limit personal jurisdiction. See e.g.,
Davis v. Farmer Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 4 comment e (1980) ("It is. . . uncertain whether there are limitations on the
territorial jurisdiction of the states beyond those imposed under the Due Process Clause.").
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from other sources6 limit a court's personal jurisdiction. In state courts,
the exercise of personal jurisdiction must conform to the fourteenth
amendment due process clause and applicable state and federal statu-
tory and decisional law.7 In federal courts, jurisdictional restrictions be-
yond those imposed by the federal Constitution may, depending on the
circumstances, derive from either state or federal law.8 When a federal
court must apply state jurisdictional law,9 it measures the constitutional-
See generally Developments in the Law---State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV. 909, 983-87
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
6 In addition to the jurisdictional limitations imposed on states by the federal Constitu-
tion, federal statutory law may constrain a state court's personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., 12
U.S.C. § 94 (1982) (stipulating the forum in which national banks may be sued). State statu-
tory law, decisional law, and rules of court may also limit a state court's jurisdictional reach.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment c (1980). For example, a number
of state long-arm statutes, which act to grant state courts jurisdiction over parties outside
their boundaries, do not extend jurisdiction to the extent permissible under the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1982-83). These
long-arm statutes act as self-imposed limitations on a state's personal jurisdiction. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment c (1980). Seegenerally 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068 (1969); Currie, The Growth of the Long
Arm: Eight Years of ExtendedJurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533 (1963).
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comments b, c (1980).
8 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment f (1980). Federal
courts generally apply state jurisdictional law absent contrary federal statutes or rules. 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1075, at 302; Clermont, Restating TeritorialJurisdiction
and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 428 (1981). See generall P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1107-08, 1118-21 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER]. An example of such a federal statute is the Federal Interpleader Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1976). Furthermore, sometimes federal courts apply federal
standards of amenability even without a federal statute or rule dictating their application. See
R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 772 (4th ed. 1978); see also infia notes 111-13 and accompanying text. An example is the
federal common law governing immunity from service of process in federal court. See 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1076.
The requirement that federal courts apply state amenability standards derives from fed-
eral legislation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment f (1980); see, e.g.,
FED. R. CIV. P. 4. Nothing precludes Congress from authorizing nationwide service of pro-
cess in all federal actions, thus avoiding application of state amenability standards in federal
courts. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v.
Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619,622 (1925);see also ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OFJURIS-
DICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 437-38 (1969); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 64, at 420 (4th ed. 1983) ('Congress has power to pro-
vide for the service of process anywhere within the United States. . . .") (footnote omitted);
Clermont, supra, at 427. But see National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 331
(1964) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Neither the Federal Constitution nor any federal statute re-
quires that a person who could not constitutionally be compelled to submit himself to a state
court's jurisdiction forfeits that constitutional right because he is sued in a Federal District
Court acting for a state court solely by reason of the happenstance of diversity jurisdiction.").
9 In many instances, federal statutes or rules specifically require the application of state
jurisdictional law in federal courts. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) re-
quires that federal service made out of state conform to the jurisdictional standards of the
forum state unless there is a contrary federal provision. See, e.g., Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v.
General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390-92 (S.D. Ohio 1967). See generally HART &
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ity of its exercise of personal jurisdiction against the standard of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause.' 0 When a federal court ap-
plies federal jurisdictional law, however, the court's personal jurisdiction
need only conform to the standard of fifth amendment due process.ll
The Supreme Court has interpreted the fourteenth amendment to
place two restrictions on a court's jurisdictional reach.12 Before a court
may assert personal jurisdiction, it must have "power" over the defend-
ant, 13 and it must ensure the "reasonableness" of adjudicating the ac-
WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 1118-21; 4C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1075, at 312-
14. In other instances, the Erie doctrine dictates the application of state law in federal courts.
See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (requiring application of state ame-
nability standards in federal court when process is served under rule 4(d)(3)). See general' 4
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, sufbra note 6, § 1075.
10 See Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948); 4 C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1075, at 316; Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969
Wis. L. Rhv. 9, 38-39.
11 The fourteenth amendment due process clause limits the jurisdictional reach of state
courts, while the fifth amendment due process clause limits the reach of federal courts. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 comment e (1971). When federal courts
use state jurisdictional law, they also apply the fourteenth amendment due process standard,
which forms the constitutional limitation on personal jurisdiction. When a federal court is
not required to apply state jurisdictional law, however, the fifth amendment constitutes the
appropriate standard for assessing the constitutionality of a federal court's jurisdictional
reach. See Note, The Use of Rule 37(b) Sanctions to Enforce Jurisdictional Discovery, 50 FORDHAM
L. REv. 814, 837 (1982)[hereinafter cited as Note, Rule 37(b) Sanctions]. Federal jurisdictional
law, for example, applies in a suit based on federal question jurisdiction with service of pro-
cess under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(3). See, e.g., Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
397 F.2d 1, 3-4 (3d Cir. 1968); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d
147, 152-54 (5th Cir. 1954); see also R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 8, at
768; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 1119. In such situations, some courts apply a fifth
amendment amenability standard. See, e.g., First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp.,
209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); cf Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber
Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 389-90 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (indicating that court would apply fifth
amendment standard had service of process not been made under rule 4(e), which obligated
court to apply state standard of amenability). Even when free to apply fifth amendment due
process, a number of courts have relied on the better-defined fourteenth amendment standard
and have invoked the constitutional restrictions that pertain to the forum state. See, e.g.,
Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 3-4 (3d Cir. 1968); Lone Star Package Car Co. v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 152-54 (5th Cir. 1954); see also R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN &K.
CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 768-69; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 1119. Reference to
the fourteenth amendment in such situations, however, is not required. See Clermont, supra
note 8, at 438-39.
When a party serves process under a federal statute that specifically provides for nation-
wide or worldwide service, federal courts most often invoke a fifth amendment standard unin-
fluenced by fourteenth amendment requirements. See, e.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527,
553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333-34 (7th Cir.
1979); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974). See generaloy Note, Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Limitations on Nationwide FederalJurisdiction, 61 B.U.L. REv. 403, 411-16 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Fi/th Amendment Limitations].
12 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980). See gen-
erally Clermont, supra note 8, at 413-26.
13 In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878), the Supreme Court held that a court
must have power over the target of an action before entering a proper judgment. Pennoyer
suggested that in the absence of waiver, the fourteenth amendment required the presence of
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tion in the forum selected by the plaintiff.' 4
the defendant in the state before a court could assert personal jurisdiction. Id at 733. The
Pennoyer Court regarded each state as the sovereign master of its own territory, but as power-
less to exert jurisdiction over parties outside its boundaries. Id at 722. Thus, notions of
federalism and territoriality underlay Pennoyer.
The Court redefined the power requirement, largely in response to technological changes
in society, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See Hanson v.Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958). In the years following Penny, the bases of jurisdic-
tional power expanded. See general/y 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, sufira note 6, § 1065. By the
time International Shoe was decided in 1945, the Court had recognized that jurisdiction could
be exercised over a party domiciled in, but absent from, the forum state, see Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), or over a party that impliedly consented to a court's jurisdiction,
see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). International Shoe unified these diverse bases of power
by suggesting that jurisdiction existed whenever the defendant had sufficient "minimum con-
tacts" with the forum state. 326 U.S. at 316. Such contacts might exist if the defendant had
continuous and substantial contacts with the forum, even if unrelated to the cause of action,
or if the defendant's contacts with the state were less substantial but highly related to the
claim. Id at 318. Isolated contacts unrelated to the cause of action, however, could not
support a finding of personal jurisdiction. Id at 319. Although the test announced in Interna-
tional Shoe included notions of reasonableness, it retained, albeit in somewhat altered form,
the power requirement established in Pennojer. For example, in reference to Pennoer, the
Court noted that "[h]istorically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person." Id at 316.
Thirteen years after Intenational Shoe, the Court in Hanson v. Dencda, 357 U.S. 235
(1958), reaffirmed that, aside from any issue of reasonableness, a court must have power over
a defendant before properly adjudicating an action:
[R]estrictions [on the reach of a state's personal jurisdiction] are more than a
guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.
However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the "minimal contacts"
with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.
Id at 251.
Finally, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980),
removed any doubt about the relevance of jurisdictional power and federalism concerns:
[W]e have never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and remain faithful to the principles of
interstate federalism embodied in the Constitution. . . . [Tihe Framers...
intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, in-
cluding, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The
sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of
all of its sister States-a limitation express or implicit in both the original
scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id at 293. Justice White continued, stating that
[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State
has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum
State is the most convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause,
acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest
the State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Id at 294.
'4 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Court held that
personal jurisdiction could be exercised only when subjecting the defendant to trial in the
forum was reasonable or fair. The Court suggested that a defendant could be brought to
court only when he had sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum to assure the fairness
of the exercise of jurisdiction:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
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The power component of fourteenth amendment due process re-
quires "minimum contacts"1 5 between the defendant and the forum
before the court may exercise personal jurisdiction. 16 The power re-
quirement allows a state court to exercise jurisdiction within the state's
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id at 316. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). Due process requirements
could be met, suggested the Court, "by such contacts of the [defendant] with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require
the [defendant] to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Id at 317.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the Court ap-
proved New York's exercise ofjurisdiction over a proceeding to determine the rights of benefi-
ciaries in a common trust fund. In deciding whether the state's exercise of jurisdiction was
proper, the Court emphasized New York's interest in providing a forum that could determine
the rights of parties in a trust created under its laws. Id at 313. A number of cases prior to
International Shoe, most notably Pennoyer v. Nef, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), categorized actions as in
rem, quasi in rem, or in personam. Under Pennoyer, categorization was required to identify the
target of the action so that the court could assess whether power existed over that target.
Mullane rejected such categorization, 339 U.S. at 312-13, and in so doing may have been
suggesting that jurisdiction could be exerted over the target of an action any time such juris-
diction was reasonable, regardless of whether "power," as conceived of in Pennoyer, is present.
See Clermont, supra note 8, at 417.
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), further elucidated the factors
to be weighed in determining the reasonableness of a jurisdictional finding. Before deciding to
impose jurisdiction on a corporate defendant, the McGee Court considered the interest of the
forum, the plaintiff, and the defendant. Id at 223-24.
Most recently, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), the
Court reasserted the importance of the reasonableness requirement. Id at 291-92. The Court
also expounded on the factors to be considered in analyzing reasonableness:
The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in
terms of "reasonableness" or "fairness." We have said that the defendant's
contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit
"does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, [326 U.S., 310, 316 (1945)], quoting Milliken
v. Me er, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). The relationship between the defendant
and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable... to require the corpora-
tion to defend the particular suit which is brought there." 326 U.S., at 317.
Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the bur-
den on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate
case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum
State's interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately
protected by the plaintiffs power to choose the forum; the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social policies.
Id at 292 (citations omitted).
15 The phrase "minimum contacts" first appeared in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The purpose of the minimum contacts test was ambigu-
ously discussed in International Shoe. Minimum contacts, as discussed in International Shoe, can
be read to ensure that the forum had "power" over the defendant or that the exercise of
jurisdiction in that forum was "reasonable." See Clermont, supra note 8, at 415-16. In World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980), the Court indicated that
the minimum contacts standard was intended to accomplish both purposes.
16 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
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boundaries, but forbids it from reaching into another state to force a
defendant to appear for trial unless the defendant had prior contact
with the forum.1 7 The power requirement appears to rest on considera-
tions of federalism, and protection of one state's sovereignty vis-a-vis
other states'. 18 The power requirement focuses only on the relationship
between the defendant and the forum.' 9 Regardless of the interests of
the plaintiff and the state, the power requirement precludes a finding of
jurisdiction absent sufficient forum-defendant contacts. 20
Reasonableness, the second component of fourteenth amendment
due process, balances a broader range of interests, including those of the
defendant, the plaintiff, and the state.2' The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the burden on the defendant in litigating in the forum chosen
by the plaintiff will always be a "primary concern" in deciding whether
jurisdiction is "reasonable." In an "appropriate case," however, the de-
termination of reasonableness will be made in light of other interests,
including those of the plaintiff and the state.22
In practice, a court testing for personal jurisdiction under the four-
teenth amendment first determines whether sufficient forum-defendant
contacts exist.23 If they do not exist, a court must dismiss the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction.24 If the forum-defendant contacts do exist,
the court must also determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is rea-
sonable in light of the interests of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the
forum. Only when both the power and reasonableness components of
fourteenth amendment due process are satisfied is the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction proper.
When the fourteenth amendment governs jurisdictional decisions in
federal courts, it creates jurisdictional restraints similar to those imposed
on the courts of the forum state. 25 Thus, the reach of these federal
17 See id at 293-94; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
18 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980); Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1878). The
requirement that a state have a certain level of contacts with the defendant may have been
intended to prevent a state with little or no interest in a dispute from adjudicating an action
and denying a state whose interest in the dispute is high an opportunity to hear the case.
19 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-94 (1980) (propos-
ing broad array of factors to be weighed in assessing amenability under reasonableness re-
quirement, but mentioning only defendant-forum contacts when discussing power
requirement); Clermont, supra note 8, at 424 ("[T]he common element in the modem power
test is the focus on the out-of-court relation of the target of the action to the forum state.").
20 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1980) (jurisdic-
tion must be denied if forum-defendant contacts are lacking, even when forum state has high
interest in hearing action and defendant would suffer no inconvenience as result of litigation).
21 Se id at 292.
22 Id
23 See Clermont, supra note 8, at 424-25.
24 See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
25 See, e.g., Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 155-56 (5th Cir.
1974); see also 2 J. MOORE, J. LucAs, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
1983]
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courts extends no further than that of the state courts "across the street."
The requirements of fifth amendment jurisdictional due process are
less well defined than those of the fourteenth amendment.2 6 A compos-
ite power-reasonableness test, similar to that invoked under the four-
teenth amendment, may also apply under fifth amendment due
process.2 7 The power requirement of such a test, however, may be satis-
fied by showing defendant contacts with the United States as a whole,
even when no contacts exist with the forum state. Similarly, when con-
sidering the interests of the forum to determine whether a jurisdictional
finding would satisfy the reasonableness requirement under the fifth
amendment, a court presumably weighs the interests of the United
States, not those of the forum state.2 8 Nonetheless, federal courts often
look to the extensive fourteenth amendment case law for guidance on
the limits of fifth amendment due process. 29 As a result, these courts
may restrict their effective reach to that of the forum state's courts, even
though such a restriction is not constitutionally mandated.
TICE 4.25[7], at 4-285 to -286, 4-286 n.20 (2d ed. 1983)[hereinafter cited as MooRE's]; 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1075, at 301-02.
26 See Note, Fifh Amendment Limitations, supra note 11, at 404, 411-16; see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment f (1982) (conjecturing as to limits of fifth
amendment due process); Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Teitorial Reach of Federal
Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520, 531-36 (1963) (federal courts are still defining limits of fifth
amendment due process); Foster, supra note 10, at 31 ("To date, the constitutional scope of
amenability has been considered almost exclusively in terms of fourteenth amendment due
process considerations .... ").
27 See Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs., 647 F.2d 200, 203
n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Clermont, supra note 8, at 436-37. Other sources, although not stating
the proposition in terms of the dual requirements of power and reasonableness, have similarly
suggested that the fifth amendment test is analogous to that of the fourteenth amendment.
See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975); Cry-
omedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 288 n.3 (D. Conn. 1975); 2 MOORE'S, supra
note 25, 4.25[5], at 4-260 to -261; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 comment f
(1982); Foster, supra note 10, at 36. But see Note, fith Amendment Limitations, supra note 11, at
412-16 (suggesting that most courts invoking fifth amendment standard under federal laws
that allow for nationwide service of process do not apply reasonableness test to assess fairness
of adjudicating in particular state or district).
28 See, e.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Fitz-
simmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1979); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138,
1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, 397 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D. Conn. 1975); see
also Foster, supra note 10, at 36; von Mchren & Trautman,Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: .4 Suggested
Analysi, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1123 n.6 (1966).
29 See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d I i37, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975)
(listing cases looking to fourteenth amendment standard); Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
397 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1968) (noting that jurisdiction should be decided under federal stan-
dard but finding fourteenth amendment due process principles applicable); R. FIELD, B.
KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 768-69 (due process standard where service of
process is made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d) with suit based on federal ques-
tion); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 1118-19 (same); Clermont, supra note 8, at 428;
Note, Fifth Amendment Limitations, supra note 11, at 411-12 (fourteenth amendment standard
sometimes applied when assessing jurisdiction under federal statute allowing for nationwide
service of process).
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B. The Application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)
to Jurisdictional Facts
Federal Rules 26 to 37 govern discovery in federal court.30 Rule 37
deals with the consequences of failing to make or cooperate in discovery.
Under rule 37, a court can impose sanctions for failure to comply with
discovery orders. Among the sanctions available to the court is an order
under rule 37(b) (2) (A)3' that certain facts be taken as established for the
purposes of an action.3 2
When a defendant challenges a court's personal jurisdiction, 33 the
30 The Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), characterized the
purpose of the discovery rules as follows: "The various instruments of discovery now serve (1)
as a device... to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device
for ascertaining the facts. . . relative to those issues." Id at 501.
31 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) reads as follows:
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action &r pending. If a party or an officer,
director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule
30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to pro-
vide or permit discovery, including an order made under subdivision (a) of
this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule
26(), the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in re-
gard to the failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or
any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of
the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order.
32 Among the other sanctions available to the court under rule 37(b)(2) is an order refus-
ing to allow the party failing to obey to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, FED.
R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (B); an order striking out pleadings or parts of pleadings, or dismissing all
or part of the action, or rendering a judgment by default, id at 37(b)(2)(C); a finding of
contempt of court against the uncooperative party, id at 37(b) (2) (D); and an assessment of
expenses and attorney's fees, id at 37(b)(2).
33 A defendant wishing to challenge personal jurisdiction has two options. First, the
defendant may appear in the original action and move that the claims asserted be dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction. If a court denies this motion and enters a judgment for the
plaintiff, the defendant may directly attack the judgment on appeal by renewing the conten-
tion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
Alternatively, the defendant may stay away from the original action entirely and risk a
default judgment. If the plaintiff attempts to enforce that default judgment in another state,
the defendant may collaterally attack the judgment by asserting that jurisdiction was im-
proper in the original action. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957). Ajudgment is not open to collateral attack on the grounds that it was simply errone-
ous. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940). See general
, 
1B J. MOORE, J. LucAS &
T. CURRIER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrIcE % 0.405 [4.-i], at 196-99 (2d ed. 1983). A de-
fendant, however, may challenge the personal jurisdiction of the original court in a collateral
attack and, if successful, the judgment will be voided. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877) (successful collateral challenge to original court's jurisdiction over res in a quasi in rem
proceeding). See generally lB J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & T. CURRIER, supra, at 206-09.
Once a court in an original action determines that it has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, that jurisdictional determination is binding in all collateral proceedings. Baldwin
v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). Thus, if a defendant appears in an
action and the court finds that personal jurisdiction is proper, resjudicata precludes a success-
ful collateral challenge to the validity of the original judgment for want of personal jurisdic-
tion. In effect then, the defendant is left with the choice of appearing in the original action,
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burden is on the plaintiff to show that jurisdiction is proper.34 If a court
cannot exercise jurisdiction based solely on the pleadings, the plaintiff
may resort to discovery devices to obtain the facts necessary to prove
jurisdiction. 35 If the defendant refuses to comply with a discovery re-
quest,36 the court may order the defendant to cooperate and may take
coercive action if the defendant disobeys such an order.3 7 One sanction
available to the court is to invoke rule 37(b) (2) (A), taking as established
the facts necessary to find personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 38
Jurisdictional findings made under rule 37(b) (2) (A) must be consis-
tent with the constitutional requirement of jurisdictional due process.
Although the fifth amendment would appear to provide the appropriate
standard for assessing the constitutionality of using rule 37 to establish
jurisdictional facts, 39 one can argue that the fourteenth amendment
should apply.40 Under either standard, the imposition of jurisdiction on
a recalcitrant defendant is probably reasonable, thus satisfying one com-
adjudicating the question of personal jurisdiction, and being bound by the court's jurisdic-
tional determination, or staying away from the original action and attacking personal juris-
diction collaterally. See id at 525.
34 See Uston v. Grand Resorts, Inc., 564 F.2d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam);
Product Promotions v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1974); cf. McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936) (burden on plaintiff to show subject matter
jurisdiction). See generaly 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1351, at 565.
35 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 2009, at 52-54 (1970).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) (1) stipulates that the permissible scope of discov-
ery includes all nonprivileged, relevant materials relating to any claim or defense. Because
lack ofjurisdiction over the person is a defense specifically mentioned in rule 12(b), jurisdic-
tional issues are within the scope of discovery.
The district judge has broad discretion to allow discovery on jurisdictional issues, and the
judge may determine these issues by receiving affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral tes-
timony, or any combination of recognized discovery methods. Washington v. Norton Mfg.,
Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979). The district court must,
however, allow the plaintiff an opportunity to prove jurisdiction. To deny the plaintiff this
opportunity would be an abuse of discretion. See Surpitski v. Hughes-Keenan Corp., 362
F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1966) (per curiam) (plaintiff, total stranger to defendant foreign corpora-
tion, should not be required, unless he has not been diligent, to try issue ofjurisdiction with-
out benefit of full discovery). But see Russell v. City State Bank, 264 F. Supp. 572 (W.D.
Okla. 1967) (plaintiff not entitled to discovery to support long-arm jurisdiction when plaintiff
failed to present evidence at hearing establishing necessary "minimum contacts" relating to
cause of action).
One Commentator suggests that because the Federal Rules tend to deemphasize plead-
ings, the information available to the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction may not be as complete
as it might be under other systems. Therefore, discovery may have to be used more fre-
quently to settle jurisdictional disputes under the Federal Rules. Note, The Use of Discovey to
Obtain Jurirdictional Facts, 59 VA. L. REv. 533, 533 (1973).
36 See Note, supra note 35, at 534.
37 See, e.g., Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(suggesting that rule 37 sanctions may be appropriate); supra notes 31-32.
38 See, e.g., English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
832 (1979).
39 See infia notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
40 See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
711-13 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
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ponent of the composite test for personal jurisdiction.4' The court, how-
ever, must also satisfy the power requirement. 42 If a court invokes a fifth
amendment standard to test the constitutionality of a rule 37(b) (2) (A)
sanction, it must find sufficient contacts between the defendant and the
United States.4 3 If a court invokes a fourteenth amendment standard,
contacts must exist between the defendant and the forum state. 44
Whether a court applies a fifth or a fourteenth amendment standard, it
is impossible for the court to determine if the defendant has the requisite
"minimum contacts" to establish that the "power" exists to invoke juris-
diction when information concerning such contacts is unavailable.4 5
Courts lacking sufficient information face a paradox. They may hesitate
to impose jurisdiction because they lack the information necessary to
satisfy the power requirement, but the defendant may have exclusive
control of this information and be unwilling to surrender it unless
41 See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 892
n.4 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), afdsub noa. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
A court assessing reasonableness must balance a broad array of interests in deciding
whether to impose jurisdiction. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. Among the
interests considered are those of the plaintiff and the forum. A defendant refusing to cooper-
ate in jurisdictional discovery deprives the plaintiff of the opportunity to choose the forum
and flouts the authority of the forum's courts. Thus, a court could conclude that, in view of
the strong interests of both plaintiff and forum, the exercise ofjurisdiction over such a defend-
ant would be reasonable.
42 Arguably, the defendant's appearance in court to challenge personal jurisdiction is by
itself sufficient to satisfy the power requirement of either the fifth or the fourteenth amend-
ment. See infra note 128. Similarly, jurisdiction might be found through implied consent. See
Comment, The Use of a Rule 37(b)(2)(A) Sanction to Establish In Personam Jurisdiction, 1982
B.Y.U. L. REv. 103, 116-20. The Court, however, did not appear to rely on either of these
approaches to find jurisdiction in Compagnie des Bauxites. See infra note 130 and accompanying
text.
43 See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
44 See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
45 As Judge Gibbons stated in his dissent in Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981), af'dsub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982):
Exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to a state long-arm statute involves
both a fairness and a power analysis. See, e.g., World- Wide Volkswagen. . . . It
may not be unfair to subject the [defendants] to suit in [the forum state].
They have certainly had notice and an opportunity to be heard. Fairness,
however, is not all. The district court must also have some power over these
defendants. On the facts available to the district court, it lacked that power.
It is questionable whether a district court may concoct adjudicatory authority
by virtue of defendant's flaunting the court's apparent lack of power. How-
ever frustrating defendant's recalcitrance, it does not imply, any more than
does these defendants' partial compliance, that defendant in fact has main-
tained forum affiliations sufficient to justify assertion of. . . jurisdiction.
Id at 892 n.4 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see also Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 715-16 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that district
court could impose its jurisdiction because it had sufficient information about defendant's
contacts with forum without additional facts sought in discovery).
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threatened by the imposition of jurisdiction. 46
II
THE CASE
In December 1975, Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee 47 (CBG)
filed a diversity action 48 in the Western District of Pennsylvania against
a group of twenty-one foreign insurers.49 CBG charged the defendants
with failure to honor an insurance policy that the plaintiffs had ob-
tained to protect against business losses resulting from breakdowns at its
mineral processing plant in Guinea. 50 The defendants' answer denied
46 In Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, 629 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 1008 (1981), the Fifth Circuit noted that its refusal to approve a rule 37(b)(2)(C) default
order as a sanction for failure to comply with jurisdictional discovery left "the district judge
in a quandary in trying to enforce his discovery order, but that is a necessary result of the
limitations of sovereignty under due process." Id at 1139.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Compagnie des Bauxites, four circuit courts of
appeals had addressed the question of the application of rule 37 sanctions to jurisdictional
facts. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 885
(3d Cir. 1981) (approving of jurisdictional application of rule 37(b)(2)(A): "As long as discov-
ery orders are permissible in aid of the jurisdictional determination, we think it fairly follows
that a district court may respond to noncompliance by the party resisting a finding of juris-
diction with an appropriate rule 37(b)(2)(A) sanction."), afd sub nom. Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Familia de Boom v.
Arosa Mercantil, 629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1980) (reversing district court's rule 37 default
finding made for failure to cooperate with jurisdictional discovery: "Although the district
court undoubtedly has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, it cannot, on its own,
establish jurisdiction."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590
F.2d 723 (8th Cir.) (holding that defendant's failure to cooperate in jurisdictional discovery
was tantamount to waiver of personal jurisdiction, thus allowing district court, under its juris-
diction to determine jurisdiction, to invoke rule 37(b)(2)(A) sanction), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(suggesting approval of jurisdictional application of rule 37 sanctions). In addition, the Fifth
Circuit disallowed the use of a rule 37 sanction against a defendant improperly served with
process who had failed to comply with discovery. See Aetna Business Credit, Inc. v. Universal
Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1981). With the Third, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits approving of the jurisdictional use of rule 37(b)(2)(A), and the Fifth Circuit
disapproving, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Compagnie des Bauxites, 454 U.S. 963
(1981), to resolve the split in the circuits.
47 CBG is a Delaware corporation, 49% of which is owned by the Republic of Guinea
and 51% by Halco (Mining) Inc. Halco, also a Delaware corporation, does business in Penn-
sylvania. CBG's principal place of business is in the Republic of Guinea in western Africa
where it mines and processes bauxite, the material from which aluminum is derived. 456 U.S.
at 696. CBG does not do any business in the United States. Preliminary Statement, Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order In re Permanent Injunction, August 5, 1980, in 2
Joint Appendix of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 343a, Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694
(1982).
48 Process was served on the Pennsylvania Commissioner of Insurance. Brief for Cross-
Petitioners at 4, Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
49 456 U.S. at 698. CBG also named the Insurance Company of North America a de-
fendant in the original action, but that defendant did not contest personal jurisdiction and
therefore was not involved in the appeal to the Supreme Court. Id
50 456 U.S. at 697-98. Halco (Mining) Inc. procured the insurance for CBG through an
American insurance broker, Marsh & McLennan, Inc. The total coverage was for $20 mil-
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personal jurisdiction. 51 CBG then sought to discover information from
the defendants to prove that personal jurisdiction was proper,52 but the
defendants repeatedly refused to cooperate. The court then issued an
order compelling cooperation.5 3 After the defendants failed to comply
with the discovery order within the time initially allowed by the court, 54
the court granted the defendants two extensions. 55 Before granting the
second extension, the court warned the defendants that failure to com-
ply would result in a rule 37(b) (2) (A) sanction establishing the existence
of personal jurisdiction. 56 CBG later moved in district court to enjoin
the defendants from prosecuting an action the insurers had brought in
lion. The Insurance Company of North America issued a policy to cover the first $10 million
in losses. Marsh & McLennan requested Bland Payne Company, a British broker, to obtain
policies to cover any losses in excess of$ 10 million, up to a limit of $20 million. Bland Payne
arranged with 21 foreign insurers, most of whom were British, to provide the excess coverage.
These insurers signed a "placing slip" indicating the portion of the excess of $10 million each
was willing to insure. Bland Payne then issued a "cover slip" showing the amount of cover-
age and specifying the percentage of the coverage each insurer had agreed to insure. No
separate policy existed. The foreign insurers adopted the Insurance Company of North
America policy "as far as applicable." Id
51 Id at 698. The Insurance Company of North America and four of the foreign insur-
ers did not contest personal jurisdiction in the district court. Id at 697 n.3, 698.
52 Id at 698. CBG made its first discovery request in August 1976, asking the defend-
ants for copies of all policies that they had issued from 1972-75 insuring against losses due to
interruptions in business. Id
53 Id In January 1977, the defendants objected to CBG's August 1976 request for docu-
ments as being overly burdensome. CBG filed a motion to compel discovery in May 1977. In
that same month, 17 of the 21 foreign insurers moved for summary judgment, claiming that
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. In-
surance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 880-81 (3d Cir. 1981). In June 1978, the district court
orally overruled the defendant's discovery objection of January 1977. Compagnie des Bauxites,
456 U.S. at 698. CBG then narrowed its discovery request to policies issued by the defendants
that were delivered in Pennsylvania or that covered risks located in Pennsylvania. The de-
fendants objected to this request, claiming that the documents sought by CBG were not in
their control, but were kept by brokers in London. Finally, in July 1978, the court ordered
the defendants to produce information on Pennsylvania-related policies they had issued be-
tween 1971 and the date of the hearing. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co.
of N. Am., 651 F.2d at 881-82.
54 651 F.2d at 882. The original discovery order of July 1978 gave the defendants 90
days to comply. Id
55 The district court granted the first extension in November 1978 after the defendants
had assured the court that they probably would be able to complete their responses within
that time. 651 F.2d at 882; Petition for Extension of Time to Answer Interrogatories, Nov. 8,
1978, in 1 Joint Appendix for Writ of Certiorari 97a, Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694
(1982). The defendants then offered to make their records, allegedly consisting of four million
files, available for inspection in London. The court seemed unimpressed with the defendants
offer of inspection, and in December of 1978, after noting that no conscientious effort had
been made to produce the requested information, granted a final 60 day extension. 456 U.S.
at 699.
56 456 U.S. at 699. After granting the defendant 60 additional days to produce the
requested information, the court warned the defendants:
[I]fyou don't get it to him in 60 days, I am going to enter an order saying that
because you failed to give the information as requested, that I am going to
assume, under Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), subsection 2(A), that there is
jurisdiction.
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the British High Court of Justice57 to rescind the insurance contracts
that formed the basis of CBG's claim.58 Before granting that CBG mo-
tion, the district court followed through on its earlier warning and in-
voked a rule 37 sanction to establish personal jurisdiction. 59 By this
time, the second deadline extension had passed and the defendants still
had not substantially complied with the discovery order.60 Over two
and one-half years had elapsed since CBG's original discovery request.61
The defendants appealed the order enjoining prosecution of the
British action.62 On appeal, seventeen of the twenty-one foreign insur-
ers maintained that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction and
therefore could not issue such an order.63 The Third Circuit rejected
this argument, holding that the district court properly found jurisdiction
through the imposition of a rule 37(b) (2) (A) sanction.64 The court of
appeals noted that the finding of personal jurisdiction did not violate
the defendants' fifth amendment due process rights. Although the dis-
trict court had found alternative grounds for its imposition of personal
jurisdiction over the insurers,65 the court of appeals rested its jurisdic-
tional finding solely on the use of a rule 37 sanction.66
On certiorari, 67 the foreign insurers argued that the district court
had created jurisdiction "by judicial fiat" in violation of their due pro-
Id (quoting Proceedings of Status Conference, Dec. 21, 1978, in 1 Joint Appendix for Writ of
Certiorari 105a, 115a, Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)).
57 456 U.S. at 710-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
58 651 F.2d at 883.
59 Proceedings on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, April 18, 19, 1979, in 1
Joint Appendix for Writ of Certiorari 144a, 199a, Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
Aside from the rule 37 sanction, the district court found two alternative grounds supporting
personal jurisdiction over the defendants. First, the defendants' known activities in Penn-
sylvania indicated that the defendants were doing business in Pennsylvania for the purposes
of that state's long-arm statute. Second, the defendants' adoption of the provisions of the
Insurance Company of North America's Pennsylvania policy was sufficient to subject the
foreign insurers to suit in that state. Id The district court also relied on alternative grounds
to exercise personal jurisdiction when it issued a permanent injunction enjoining the British
action. Preliminary Statement, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order In re Perma-
nent Injunction, August 5, 1980, in 2 Joint Appendix of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
342a, 356a-57a, Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
60 The court granted the second extension, which was to last for a period of 60 days, on
December 21, 1978. It imposed the rule 37(b)(2)(A) sanctions on April 19, 1979. 456 U.S. at
699.
61 The plaintiffs made their first discovery request in August, 1976. Id at 698.
62 Id at 699 n.6.
63 Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 880 n.2
(3d Cir. 1981). Four foreign insurers conceded personal jurisdiction, but appealed the order
granting the injunction as well as the denial of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.
Id
64 Id at 886.
65 See supra note 59.
66 651 F.2d at 886 n.9.
67 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
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cess rights.68 The Court rejected this argument, noting that the defend-
ants effectively waived personal jurisdiction by refusing to cooperate
with jurisdictional discovery. The Court thus permitted application of
rule 37(b)(2)(A). 69
Justice White, writing for the Court, began by stating that personal
jurisdiction is a due process right of the individual, an "individual lib-
erty interest," and not a right intended to protect the sovereignty of the
forum.70 The Court then contrasted personal jurisdiction with subject
matter jurisdiction,7 ' stating that the latter is intended to protect the
integrity of the federal system. Because personal jurisdiction is intended
to protect the individual,7 2 not the federal system, the individual may
waive that right. In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that par-
ties have traditionally waived personal jurisdiction through a number of
"legal arrangements" including appearance, contractual agreement,
stipulation, agreements to arbitrate, and failure to enter a timely objec-
tion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h). Analogous to these
arrangements is a refusal to cooperate in jurisdictional discovery.73
Thus, the Court claimed that the jurisdictional use of rule 37(b) (2) (A) is
no more offensive to due process than is a waiver of personal jurisdiction
for failure to raise a timely objection:
The expression of legal rights is often subject to certain proce-
dural rules: The failure to follow those rules may well result in a cur-
tailment of the rights. Thus, the failure to enter a timely objection to
personal jurisdiction constitutes, under Rule 12(h) (1), a waiver of the
objection. A sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) consisting of a finding
of personal jurisdiction has precisely the same effect. As a general
proposition, the Rule 37 sanction applied to a finding of personal ju-
risdiction creates no more of a due process problem than the Rule
12(h) waiver.74
The foreign insurers also contended that because a defendant has
no obligation to obey an order issued prior to the establishment of per-
sonal jurisdiction, 75 a court cannot invoke a sanction for failure to com-
ply. The Court rejected this argument, noting that the foreign insurers
could have stayed away from the Pennsylvania action entirely and, if
necessary, attacked jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding. 76 By choos-
ing to appear before the court in the original action, the defendants
68 Id at 696.
69 Id at 708-09.
70 Id at 702-03.
71 Id at 701-03.
72 Id at 703.
73 Id at 703-05.
74 d at 705.
75 Id at 706.
76 Id
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were obligated to abide by the court's jurisdictional determination,
whether made by conventional fact finding or by the imposition of a
"variety of legal rules and presumptions" including rule 37(b)(2)(A). 77
In his concurrence, 78 Justice Powell offered two interpretations of
the Court's opinion in an attempt to determine whether the Court had
based its jurisdictional finding in Compagnie des Bauxites on the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth or the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.79 First, Justice Powell suggested that the district court ultimately
invoked the Pennsylvania long-arm statute to obtain personal jurisdic-
tion in Compagnie des Bauxites, obligating the Court to apply fourteenth
amendment due process. 80 If this were the case, Justice Powell argued,
the Court's assertion that due process is not intended to protect state
sovereignty contradicts the power requirement of the fourteenth amend-
ment.81 The Court responded to this charge in footnote 10 by admitting
that the fourteenth amendment "reflects an element of federalism" and
denying that their opinion altered the requirement of minimum con-
tacts.82 The Court, however, also stated that the power requirement
"must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause." 83
Alternatively, Justice Powell suggested that the Court might have
relied exclusively on rule 37, and not the state long-arm statute, to find
jurisdiction in Compagnie des Bauxites. 84 Justice Powell, however, ap-
peared to reject this interpretation. Exclusive reliance on rule 37 would
imply that the Court applied a fifth amendment due process standard in
Compagnie des Bauxites. 85
Having established the general principle that a court may invoke
77 Id at 707.
78 Id at 709.
79 d at 710-15. In the introductory portion of Part I of his concurrence, Justice Powell
suggested that the Court's opinion must have invoked a fourteenth amendment jurisdictional
due process standard. Part IA explores the implications of this suggestion. Part IB discusses
the possibility that the Court, rather than relying on the state long-arm statute to find juris-
diction, and thus necessitating the use of the fourteenth amendment, relied solely on rule 37.
Justice Powell never explicitly stated that the fifth amendment, and not the fourteenth,
would provide the appropriate constitutional standard if the court relied solely on rule 37.
This conclusion, however, is implicit in Justice Powell's assertion that, if the Court based its
opinion solely on rule 37, the result would not affect "state jurisdiction". Id at 714.
80 Id at 713.
81 Id at 710-14.
82 Id at 702 n.10.
83 Id
84 Id at 714-16.
85 See id at 713. Justice Powell first concluded that, under the Rules of Decision Act,
"the relevant constitutional limits would not be those imposed directly on federal courts by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but those applicable to state jurisdictional
law under the Fourteenth." Id Although admitting that the Court's opinion could be read,
in the alternative, to rely exclusively on rule 37 and the fifth amendment, Justice Powell
contended that the Court "does not cast its decision in these terms." Id at 714.
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rule 37(b)(2)(A) to find personal jurisdiction, the Court examined the
district court's application of rule 37 to the facts of Compagnie des Baux-
ites. 86 Justice White asserted that both rule 37's general requirement
that a court may order only those sanctions as are "just,"8 7 and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment as interpreted in Hammond Packing
Co. v. Arkansas,88 restrict the use of rule 37(b)(2)(A). Justice White
found, however, that the district court's use of rule 37(b) (2) (A) in Com-
pagnie des Bauxites was permissible and not in violation of these
restrictions.8 9
III
ANALYSIS
Compagnie des Bauxites held that the jurisdictional use of rule
37(b) (2) (A) does not offend constitutional due process. Nevertheless, the
Court in Compagnie des Bauxites spoke generally of the "Due Process
Clause" without indicating whether it was invoking the due process
clause of the fifth amendment or the fourteenth amendment.90 The first
part of this analysis contends that the Court's holding, when narrowly
construed, pertains only to fifth amendment due process.9 ' In strongly
worded dicta, however, Compagnie des Bauxites calls into question long-
established fourteenth amendment jurisdictional doctrines that the
86 Id at 707-09.
87 d at 707; see FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
88 212 U.S. 322 (1909). The Advisory Committee note to original rule 37, 28 U.S.C. at
463 (1976), states: "The provisions of this rule. . . are in accord with Hammond Packing Co. v.
Arkansas ... .
In Hammond Packing, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling striking a defend-
ant's answer and entering a default judgment against him after the defendant had refused to
produce documents as ordered by the court. The Court concluded that it was reasonable to
presume that the defendant's refusal to produce the documents indicated that his defense was
meritless. 212 U.S. at 350-51. The Court held that entering a default judgment under such a
presumption was consistent with due process. It distinguished the earlier case of Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), in which it had held that a lower court had denied due process
by imposing a similar sanction as "mere punishment" for failure to obey a court order. 212
U.S. at 350.
89 The Court pointed to a number of factors in support of its contention that the district
court's imposition of rule 37Cb)(2)(A) was "just." 456 U.S. at 707-08. Among these factors
were the defendant's recalcitrance after repeated promises to deliver the requested informa-
tion, the independent indications that jurisdiction was proper, and the ample warning that
the district court gave the defendants concerning the possible invocation of the sanction.
Furthermore, the Court claimed that the defendants failure to comply with jurisdic-
tional discovery after objecting to personal jurisdiction led to a presumption that jurisdiction
was proper and thus met the test of Hammond Packing. Id at 709.
90 The Court's discussion in footnote 10 specifically refers to state court jurisdiction and
thus pertains to the fourteenth amendment. 456 U.S. at 702 n.10. The Court, however, does
not indicate whether it intended its textual analysis of due process to apply to the fourteenth
amendment, the fifth amendment, or both.
91 See infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
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Court expressly had endorsed only three years earlier.92 The second
part of this analysis discusses inconsistencies between Compagnie des Baux-
ites and recent fourteenth amendment jurisdictional precedent and sug-
gests that the Court may be prepared to adopt a new approach to deal
with questions of personal jurisdiction.93
A. Fifth Amendment Jurisdictional Due Process
As has been suggested, 94 the Court in Compagnie des Bauxites failed
to indicate whether it was employing fifth amendment or fourteenth
amendment jurisdictional due process. 95  The Court apparently in-
tended that many of its statements apply to both the fourteenth and the
fifth amendments. Nevertheless, determining which constitutional pro-
vision the Court invoked in approving the jurisdictional use of rule
37(b) (2) (A) is important for precedential reasons. If the Court relied on
the fifth amendment, its pronouncements concerning the nature of per-
92 Compare Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702 n. 10 ("The restriction on state sover-
eign power described in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.") with World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) ("Even if the defendant would
suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of an-
other State. . . the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may
sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment.") (citation omitted).
93 See infra notes 121-58 and accompanying text.
94 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
95 This question does not arise regarding the jurisdictional reach of the state courts,
which is limited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLIICr OF LAWS § 24 comment e (1969). The fourteenth amendment, how-
ever, does not form a mandatory constraint on the personal jurisdiction of federal courts
except when those courts apply state jurisdictional law. See supra note 11. Frequently the Erie
doctrine, see, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219, 231 (2d Cir. 1963), or Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4, will require that federal courts apply state jurisdictional law. State juris-
dictional law, in turn, requires the application of fourteenth amendment due process. See,
e.g., Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193, 194 (1st Cir. 1948);see also Clermont,
supra note 8, at 428 n.86; Foster, supra note 10, at 38-39.
When state jurisdictional law does not apply, the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment limits the personal jurisdiction of federal courts. For example, when a federal statute
allows for nationwide or worldwide service of process, see, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982), amenability is limited only by the fifth amendment.
When service is made under these statutes federal courts will often require only that the
defendant have contacts with the United States as a whole. It is not necessary to establish
contacts with the forum state. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d
1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974) (when nationwide service of process is authorized by Congress and
defendants live within United States "the 'minimal contacts' principle does not . . . seem
particularly relevant in evaluating the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction based on
nationwide, but not extraterritorial, service of process") (emphasis in original).
Similarly, in a suit based on federal question jurisdiction, the fourteenth amendment
does not apply when rule 4(d) (3) controls service of process. In such cases, however, federal
courts will often look to the restraints imposed by the fourteenth amendment to guide their
jurisdictional decisions. Thus, the resulting standard is similar to that imposed on state
courts. See supra note 11.
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sonal jurisdiction only apply to the fourteenth amendment as dicta, thus
weakening their impact on the jurisdiction of state courts.
Apparently concerned by the Court's failure to indicate whether it
was invoking the fourteenth or the fifth amendment, Justice Powell ex-
plored two possible readings of the Court's opinion in his concurrence.96
Justice Powell concluded that the Court decided Compagnie des Bauxites
under the fourteenth amendment 97 and offered two interrelated argu-
ments98 in support of this conclusion: (1) that the Erie doctrine obligates
federal courts to apply state jurisdictional law and a fourteenth amend-
ment jurisdictional standard in diversity actions such as Compagnie des
Bauxites 99 and (2) that the district court ultimately invoked the state
long-arm statute to find jurisdiction over the foreign insurers, thus re-
quiring the application of a fourteenth amendment jurisdictional
standard.l°°
Careful analysis suggests that, contrary to Justice Powell's interpre-
tation, the Court may have applied a fifth amendment standard in Com-
pagnie des Bauxites. 101 Justice Powell's arguments provide a convenient
and helpful framework for exploring the due process issues in Compagnie
des Bauxites.
1. The Erie Doctl'he
In his concurrence, Justice Powell argued that, in the absence of a
federal rule or statute establishing a federal basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction, the Rules of Decision Act 10 2 and the Erie doctrine 0 3 re-
quire that state law determine the jurisdictional reach of the federal
96 The introductory portion (Part I and Part IA) of Justice Powell's concurrence inter-
prets the Court's opinion to have been decided under the fourteenth amendment. Part IB
suggests that the Court invoked the fifth amendment. See supra note 79.
97 See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
98 Justice Powell does not offer these arguments separately. For the purposes of exposi-
tion, however, they will be examined individually here.
99 456 U.S. at 711-12.
100 Id at 711-12.
101 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Compagnie des Bauxites, two courts of appeals
had upheld district court decisions finding jurisdiction under rule 37(b)(2)(A). Both these
courts applied a fifth amendment standard. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 886 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The sanction did not violate the fifth
amendment due process rights of the [defendants]."), afdsub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ireland
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp.,
590 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir.) ("The imposition of this sanction did not deny the [defendant] its
fifth amendment rights to due process."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
102 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
103 A thorough discussion of the Erie doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
more complete treatment, see 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §§ 4501-15 (1982). For a discussion of the Erie doctrine as it relates to
personal jurisdiction, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1075; Comment, Personal
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations in Diversity Actions: A Tltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U.
CHI. L. REv. 752 (1964).
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courts in diversity cases.10 4 As a result, Justice Powell argued, the con-
stitutional restrictions on personal jurisdiction in diversity actions such
as Compagnie des Bauxites should be those imposed on the states by the
fourteenth amendment.
Contrary to Justice Powell's argument, state law should not govern
the jurisdictional reach of federal courts sitting in diversity in those in-
stances where there is a strong federal interest in following a federal
standard. In Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 105 the "leading
case"'1 6 calling for the application of state jurisdictional law in diversity
actions, the Second Circuit applied state law because the court could
find "no federal policy that should lead federal courts in diversity cases
to override valid state laws."' 0 7 However, when a defendant challenges
the jurisdiction of a federal court and then refuses to obey a jurisdic-
tional discovery order, he flouts the power of the court. In such a situa-
tion, a strong federal interest exists in maintaining respect for the federal
court system by forcing the defendant to comply with the discovery or-
der.' 08 This strong federal interest constitutes "affirmative counter-
vailing considerations"' 1 9 sufficient to sway the Eie balance in favor of
104 456 U.S. at 711.
105 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
106 456 U.S. at 712 n.3,
107 320 F.2d at 226. In Arrowsmih, the Second Circuit held that a federal court should
apply state law to determine jurisdictional reach in. a diversity action when plaintiff served
process in-state under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(3). The court noted that rule
4(d) (3) regulates only the "manner of service" and thus does not itself dictate that state law
be applied to the question of amenability to suit. Id The court, however, concluded that the
state had a strong interest in applying its own jurisdictional provisions and that in the absence
of a comparable federal interest, state law should prevail. Id
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Clark relied on Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958), to argue that the federal interest in a uniform and independent federal
court system dictated the application of federal law. 320 F.2d at 235. See general 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1075, at 303-16; Comment, supra note 103.
108 In National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976),
the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the strong federal interest in preventing failure to
obey discovery orders issued by federal courts. In that case, the Court held that a rule
37(b)(2)(C) dismissal was not an unduly harsh sanction when the plaintiffs had shown "fla-
grant bad faith" in failing to respond to written interrogatories as ordered by the district
court. Id at 643. The Court imposed the severe dismissal sanction both to penalize the
plaintiff in the case at hand and to deter others who, without such a deterrent, might feel free
"to flout other discovery orders of other district courts." Id
109 The Supreme Court employed the phrase "affirmative countervailing considerations"
in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958), to describe the
federal interest in applying federal law to determine judge-jury roles in diversity actions. In
Byrd, the Court admitted that applying federal law in place of state law might affect the
outcome of the case. Id The Court's earlier decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 109 (1945), seemed to require the use of state law in any instance when the application of
federal law might affect the outcome of a suit. The Byrd Court argued, however, that under
the facts, strong federal interests--"afflrmative countervailing considerations"--outweighed
any outcome determinative effect and dictated the application of federal law. 356 U.S. at
536-40.
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applying a federal jurisdictional standard." 0
Federal law applies in a number of areas analogous to the jurisdic-
tional use of rule 37(b) (2) (A). Generally, the Erie doctrine allows the
application of federal jurisdictional law when a court imposes jurisdic-
tion over the defendant as a result of the defendant's actions during
litigation.I' For example, federal law determines whether the assertion
of a counterclaim,' 12 or participation in a hearing on a preliminary in-
junction, 13 constitutes a submission to personal jurisdiction in federal
110 See Note, The Use of Rule 37(h) Sanctions to Enforce Jurisdictional Discovey, 50 FORDHAM
L. REV. 814, 833-35 (1982).
In a similar vein, Professors Wright and Miller suggest that "countervailing considera-
tions" supply an exception to the Arrowsmith rule to permit the application of federal jurisdic-
tional law to multiparty litigation. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1075, at 311-
12. The use of federal law in this area would facilitate joinder of parties and further the
federal interest in "encouraging the complete determination of all issues in one suit." Id at
311. See alro Foster, supra note 10, at 26-28.
I11 R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 772 ("[F]ederal law deter-
mines which acts committed in the course of litigating will confer jurisdiction over the person;
thus, federal law will determine whether a defendant has made a general appearance."); 5 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 6, § 1344, at 524 ("The sufficiency of an appearance or
notice of appearance is tested by federal principles and not by state practice.").
112 See Neifeld v. Steinberg, 438 F.2d 423, 425-26 (3d Cir. 1971).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) does not indicate whether the assertion of a coun-
terclaim constitutes a waiver of objections to personal jurisdiction. Hasse v. American Photo-
graphic Corp., 299 F.2d 666, 668-69 (10th Cir. 1962); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note
6, § 1397, at 876-77. But see Keil Lock Co. v. Earle Hardware Mfg. Co., 16 F.R.D. 388
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (because counterclaim is "defense" under rule 12(b), assertion of such claim
does not waive objections to personal jurisdiction).
Neifddv. Steinberg applies alternate reasoning to conclude that federal law should govern
whether or not the assertion of a noncompulsory counterclaim constitutes a waiver of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The court argues first that rules 12(b) and 12(h) "manifest an intent to
'occupy the field' with respect to questions relating to the waiver ofjurisdictional defenses by
a defendant." Id at 426. Thus, the Third Circuit suggests that the Supreme Court's decision
in Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), which held that the federal rules should apply in
all diversity actions when on point, dictates the application of federal law. The Neifeld court,
however, asserted that it would not follow state law "even if the Federal Civil Rules did not
implicitly cover the instant case." Id Again, the court relied on Hanna v. Plummer to find that
a federal rule should apply when, as in this instance, its application will not encourage forum-
shopping or affect substantially "inequitable administration of the laws." Id (quoting Hanna
v. Plummer, 380 U.S. at 468).
For examples of other diversity cases apparently applying federal law to decide whether
the assertion of a counterclaim constitutes a waiver of personal jurisdiction, see Hasse v.
American Photographic Corp., 299 F.2d 666, 668-69 (10th Cir. 1962); Kinkade v. Jeffery-De
Witt Insulator Corp., 242 F.2d 328, 332-33 (5th Cir. 1957); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise
Litig., 92 F.R.D. 398, 413-15 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (applying federal law to find that assertion of
counterclaim and inaction of defendant between filing of answer and motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction did not constitute waiver ofjurisdictional objections); cf Merz v.
Hemmerle, 90 F.R.D. 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying federal law to find that assertion of
cross-claim and subsequent grant of court's approval to file third party claim constituted
waiver of objection to improper service of process).
113 Se Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 545-47 (3d Cir.
1967) (citing only federal law in finding that participation in four days of hearings on prelimi-
nary injunction constituted waiver of objections to personal jurisdiction). For other examples
of federal courts following federal law in deciding whether in-court actions constitute submis-
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diversity actions. Applying federal law to determine whether a court
should invoke jurisdiction against a defendant as a result of his refusal to
obey a jurisdictional discovery order appears consistent with the appli-
cation of federal law in these analogous areas.
Furthermore, the Court's use of precedent in Compagnie des Bauxites
suggests that such a waiver is a matter of federal law. Had the Court
applied a state jurisdictional standard, it would have examined Penn-
sylvania law on the question of jurisdictional waiver. The Court, how-
ever, never discussed whether Pennsylvania law recognizes jurisdictional
waiver nor whether failure to obey a jurisdictional discovery order
would be analogous to such a waiver under the laws of that state. Thus,
the Erie doctrine does not require the Court to invoke a fourteenth
amendment due process standard in Compagnie des Bauxites.
2. The State Long-Arm Statute
Justice Powell suggested that the district court found jurisdiction
over the foreign insurers by first using rule 37 to establish facts showing
that the defendants had contacts with Pennsylvania and then relying on
those facts to satisfy the requirements of the state long-arm statute. 1 4
Because Justice Powell concluded that the district court ultimately re-
lied on state law to find personal jurisdiction over the foreign insurers,
he asserted that fourteenth amendment due process governed the juris-
dictional determination in Compagnie des.Bauxites. 1,5 This argument mis-
sions to personal jurisdiction, see Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 291 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1972);
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Brecheisen, 323 F.2d 79, 83-84 (10th Cir. 1963) (state
rule that filing an answer constitutes waiver of defective service will not be followed in federal
diversity action).
Federal law may also determine whether the use of fraud or force to procure personal
jurisdiction nullifies an otherwise proper jurisdictional finding in federal court. See R. FIELD,
B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 772 ("[QOuestions. . . of the effect of fraud or
force in the attempted acquisition of personal jurisdiction are generally held to be governed in
all federal actions by federal law."). The following cases decide the fraud or force issue with-
out express reference to the law of the forum state, or make reference to state law, but appar-
ently do not consider that law controlling: Buchanan v. Wilson, 254 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1958)
(citing no cases on issue); Tope v. Beal, 98 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1938) (same); Sunshine Kitchens,
Inc. v. Alanthus Corp., 65 F.R.D. 4 (S.D. Fla. 1974) (citing one federal and no state cases on
issue); Century Brick Corp. v. Bennet, 235 F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (citing one case from
forum state, and numerous other federal and state cases on issue); Oliver v. Cruson, 153 F.
Supp. 74 (D. Mont. 1957) (same). But see Schwarz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills Inc., 110
F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940) (apparently following law of forum state but also citing federal cases);
Keane v. McGeady, 36 F.R.D. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (citing only one case from forum state).
Finally, federal law controls questions of immunity from service of process in federal
diversity actions. See, e.g., Marlowe v. Baird, 301 F.2d 169, 170 (6th Cir. 1962) ("Immunity
from process is certainly a procedural matter . . . . The holding in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins. . . has no application.'). Seegenerall y 2 MOORE's, supra note 25, 1 4.20, at 4-168
("Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and its progeny do not make state law controlling.').
114 456 U.S. at 711 & n.2.
115 Id at 713.
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construes, however, the manner in which courts apply rule 37 to
jurisdictional findings.
Justice Powell's assertion that the Pennsylvania long-arm statute
was the ultimate source of the district court's jurisdictional determina-
tion suggests that a court would perform a two-step analysis before de-
ciding to apply rule 37(b) (2) (A) to find personal jurisdiction. First, a
court would establish a set of jurisdictional facts under rule 37 and then,
in a separate step, decide whether those facts show sufficient contacts
between the defendant and the forum to satisfy the state long-arm
statute.
It seems unlikely, however, that a court using rule 37 to find per-
sonal jurisdiction actually applies the two step process proposed by Jus-
tice Powell." t6 Instead, as the emphasis on waiver in Compagnie des
Bauxites suggests, a court simply decides that the defendant's refusal to
participate in jurisdictional discovery is sufficiently heinous to permit a
finding of jurisdictional waiver. 1 7 A court employs rule 37(b) (2) (A)
only as a convenient mechanism to effectuate such a waiver."t 8
116 It is unlikely, for example, that a judge would apply rule 37(b)(2) (A) to jurisdictional
facts and then decide that the facts taken as established are insufficient to establish
jurisdiction.
117 The district court took this approach in Compagnie des Bauxites, relying on alternate
grounds to find personal jurisdiction. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. As one
ground, the court held that the admitted and known facts were themselves sufficient to sup-
port a determination that the defendants were doing business in Pennsylvania. Proceedings
on Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, April 18, 19, 1979, in 1 Joint Appendix for
Writ of Certiorari 144a, 196a, Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). Based on that
determination, the court expressly invoked the state long-arm statute to find that personal
jurisdiction existed: "The Court . ..finds that under the admitted facts and known facts,
that the [defendants] are, in fact, doing business in Pennsylvania . . . .And the Court, under
those circumstances, invokes the Pennsylvania Long-Arm Statute .... " Id at 199a. (emphasis ad-
ded).
In addition, the district court applied rule 37(b)(2)(A) to support its jurisdictional find-
ing. Id When invoking rule 37, however, the district court did not mention reliance on the
state long-arm statute. The court's statements suggested that it viewed the jurisdictional use
of rule 37 as a "one-step process" tantamount to a finding of waiver. The court did not
suggest that it was first establishing jurisdictional facts under rule 37 and then employing
those facts to find jurisdiction under the state long-arm statute:
The Court has looked through the voluminous documents and papers in this
case, and the Court finds, as a fact, that the material promised this Court by
the [defendants]. . .has not been forthcoming, and the Court, at this point,
will rule and impose a sanction, and does find that the Excess Insurers are, in
fact, subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this court.
Id
118 Admittedly, the Court in Compagnie des Bauxites never went so far as to state categori-
cally that the foreign insurers' refusal to cooperate in jurisdictional discovery constituted a
jurisdictional waiver. The closest the Court came to categorically asserting that a jurisdic-
tional finding under rule 37(b)(2)(A) is, in effect, a finding of jurisdictional waiver, occurred
when the Court discussed rule 12(h)(1): "[T]he failure to enter a timely objection to personal
jurisdiction constitutes, under Rule 12(h)(1), a waiver of the objection. A sanction under
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3. Application of the Fifth Amendment
In sum, the Erie doctrine suggests that federal law should control
the determination ofjurisdiction under rule 37(b)(2)(A). Incidental reli-
ance on state long-arm statutes does not argue against the application of
a federal standard.
When a federal court applies federal jurisdictional law to obtain
personal jurisdiction, the fifth amendment provides the due process
standard.' 19 If the Court in Compagnie des Bauxites applied federal law to
decide jurisdiction, its opinion, when read most narrowly, holds only
that the jurisdictional application of rule 37(b)(2) (A), being analogous
to waiver, is consistent with fifth amendment due process. Such a nar-
row holding does not directly affect the constitutional standard applied
to state court jurisdictional findings made under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 120 Nor does it affect the constitutional standard applied in federal
courts in those instances in which federal statutory or decisional law
requires the application of fourteenth amendment jurisdictional due
process in federal proceedings.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Jurisdictional Due Process
1. Applicability of Holding to Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Although one can read Compagnie des Bauxites narrowly to apply
only to fifth amendment due process, 121 the Court's opinion may affect
fourteenth amendment due process as well. The fifth amendment juris-
dictional standard, although ill-defined, is similar to that of the four-
Rule 37(b) (2) (A) consisting of a finding of personal jurisdiction has precisely the same effect."
456 U.S. at 705.
In other portions of the opinion, however, the Court appeared to envisage a two-step
process relying on the state long-arm statute: "The sanction took as established the facts-
contacts with Pennsylvania-that CBG was seeking to establish through discovery. That a
particular legal consequence-personal jurisdiction of the court over the defendants-follows
from this, does not in any way affect the appropriateness of the sanction." Id. at 709.
Were a categorical waiver recognized in Compagnie des Bauxites, the use of rule 37 to
establish jurisdictional facts would have been superfluous. The defendant's refusal to cooper-
ate in jurisdictional discovery would have been sufficient alone to waive jurisdiction. The
court need not have invoked rule 37 to establish jurisdictional facts once jurisdiction had
already been found through waiver. See Note, Sanctions to EnforceJurisdictionalDiscove7y: Consti-
tutional and Pudential Limitations, 68 VA. L. Rsv. 921, 930 (1982). Nevertheless, the emphasis
on jurisdictional waiver in Compagnie des Bauxites, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text,
indicates that the Court viewed rule 37 as simply a means of effectuating jurisdictional
waiver. The Court based its analysis on the concept of waiver, not on the use of rule 37 to
establish jurisdictional facts.
119 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
120 Justice Powell apparently concluded that the Court relied on the fourteenth amend-
ment, but conceded that a holding based solely on rule 37 would not affect "state jurisdic-
tion." 456 U.S. at 714-15. A rationale relying exclusively on rule 37 would presumably be
tested against a fifth amendment due process standard.
121 See supra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
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teenth amendment. 122 In light of this similarity, the Court's failure to
indicate that it based its opinion on the fifth amendment, and its ambig-
uous discussion of the "due process clause," logically suggest that the
Court intended its opinion to apply equally to the fourteenth amend-
ment. Moreover, the Court relied almost exclusively on fourteenth
amendment cases to support its jurisdictional argument. 123 Although
such reliance is not unusual in cases decided under the fifth amend-
ment, 24 it does strongly suggest that the Court would reach a similar
result if it expressly founded its holding on a fourteenth amendment
standard. Given these indications that the Court intended to implicate
fourteenth amendment due process, it is fruitful to compare the Court's
holding with fourteenth amendment jurisdictional precedent.
Prior to the Court's pronouncements in Compagnie des Bauxites, juris-
dictional due process required both that a court have power over the
defendant and that the exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable. 25 In Com-
pagnie des Bauxites, the Court clearly invoked the reasonableness compo-
nent of this composite test, which is based primarily on fairness to the
defendant, 126 by demanding that any finding of jurisdiction not offend
the defendant's "individual liberty interests."' 27 Whether the Court de-
manded satisfaction of the power requirement is less clear.
Although the Court in Compagnie des Bauxites could have held that
the district court had power over the defendant because of the defend-
122 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
123 One exception, perhaps the only one, may be Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), in which the court
construed a Spanish government agency's agreement to arbitrate in the United States as con-
sent to personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff in the case served process in accord with the
United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), which dictates that service conform to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
124 Courts deciding jurisdictional cases under the fifth amendment will often look to the
fourteenth amendment standard, and cases construing that standard, for guidance. See supra
note 29 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
127 The Court measured the imposition of jurisdiction in Compagnie des Bauxites against
the standards established by Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909), and
the "as are just" requirement of rule 37. 456 U.S. at 705-08. The Court employed these
standards to ensure fairness to the defendant.
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ant's appearance in court128 or because of implied consent, 129 it adopted
neither of these approaches. 30 Instead, the Court emphatically dis-
avowed any sovereignty protections embodied in jurisdictional due pro-
cess, the rationale on which the power requirement is traditionally
thought to rest.' 3 ' The Court rejected these concerns, claiming that per-
sonal jurisdiction "represents a restriction on judicial power not as a
matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."'1 32 This re-
jection of sovereignty protections, and the Court's failure to confront the
power requirement, suggest that the Court may have discarded that re-
quirement. Examination of the Court's discussion of fourteenth amend-
ment due process in footnote 10, however, may indicate otherwise.
128 The defendant's very appearance in court to challenge personal jurisdiction was per-
haps sufficient to grant that jurisdiction. Support for such an interpretation can be found in
York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1890).
In York, a Texas court served the defendant in St. Louis in a suit brought by the State of
Texas for nonpayment of rent. Defendant's counsel attempted to make a special appearance
solely to challenge personal jurisdiction. Texas, however, did not recognize special appear-
ances and construed all appearances by a defendant to be submissions to the court's jurisdic-
tion. The court entered a judgment against the defendant, basing personal jurisdiction on the
defendant's appearance. The Supreme Court found the Texas jurisdictional statute constitu-
tional, claiming that fourteenth amendment due process required only that the defendant
have an opportunity to contest jurisdiction prior to deprivation of liberty or property: "If at
that time of immediate attack [upon the liberty of property of the defendant] protection is
afforded, the substantial guarantee of the [fourteenth] amendment is preserved, and there is
no just cause of complaint." 137 U.S. at 20. In York, the defendant could have provided
himself such protection, reasoned the Court, had he stayed away from Texas completely.and
collaterally attacked any attempt to enforce a Texas default judgment. Thus, the defendant
was left with a choice of coming to Texas, submitting to personal jurisdiction by his appear-
ance and defending on the merits, or staying in Missouri and attacking jurisdiction collater-
ally.
The Supreme Court decided York well before International Shoe Co. . Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1944), which established the reasonableness component ofjurisdictional due process. See
supra note 14. Nonetheless, York does suggest that any appearance by a defendant satisfies the
power requirement of personal jurisdiction. Thus, under York, a federal court might possess
jurisdictional power over any defendant who appears, makes a direct attack on personal juris-
diction, and later refuses to cooperate in jurisdictional discovery.
129 See Comment, supra note 42, at 116-20 ("[A] contractual agreement, appointment of
an agent . . . , [a]n agreement to arbitrate, the initiation of a prior related action . . . , a
request for some form of affirmative relief, or a stipulation ...will also waive the defense
.. ") (footnotes omitted).
130 The Court centered its argument on the concept of jurisdictional waiver. See supra
notes 70-74, 117-18 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Court noted that the defend-
ant could have stayed away from the original action and attacked any resulting default judg-
ment in a collateral proceeding. See supra notes 75-7 7 and accompanying text. This emphasis
suggests that the Court may have relied on a theory of implied consent or appearance to find
personal jurisdiction. Because the Court emphasized the protection of "individual liberty
interests" and eschewed the protection of state sovereignty, however, it may not have in-
tended that the implied consent or jurisdiction through appearance arguments apply to the
power requirement.
131 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
132 456 U.S. at 702.
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2. Footnote 10: The Court's Reappraisal of Fourteenth Amendment
Jurisdictional Due Process
The Court in Compagnie des Bauxites did not expressly state in the
text of its opinion whether it intended its holding to apply to both four-
teenth amendment and fifth amendment due process. In footnote 10,133
however, the Court unambiguously indicated, although admittedly by
way of dicta, that it intended its rejection of sovereignty concerns to
extend to the fourteenth amendment. Referring specifically to the four-
teenth amendment, the Court asserted that "[t]he restriction on state
sovereign power. . . must be seen as ultimately a function of the indi-
vidual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause."' 134
The Court suggested two reasons for its disavowal of sovereignty
concerns in fourteenth amendment due process. First, the Court found
no historical basis to support considerations of sovereignty in determin-
ing jurisdictional reach under the due process clause. 135 The due pro-
cess clause, the Court noted, "is the only source of the personal
jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of fed-
eralism concerns." 13 6 Second, the Court acknowledged the inconsis-
tency inherent in allowing a defendant to waive personal jurisdiction, a
right that supposedly belongs to, and protects, the sovereignty of the
states.137 As the Court indicated, "[i]ndividual actions cannot change
the powers of sovereignty."' 138
In his concurrence, Justice Powell criticized the Court's opinion "as
finding that 'minimum contacts' no longer are a constitutional require-
ment for the exercise by a state court of personal jurisdiction over an
unconsenting defendant." 139 Justice Powell added that the Court had
rewritten the doctrine of personal jurisdiction to allow jurisdiction
"[w]henever the Court's notions of fairness are not offended."' 14  The
Court, however, claimed that "[c]ontrary to the suggestion of JUSTICE
POWELL," its holding did "not alter the requirement that there be 'mini-
mum contacts' between the nonresident defendant and the forum
133 Id at 702 n.10.
134 Id
135 d Several commentators writing prior to Compagnie des Bauxites noted the lack of
historical basis for injecting federalism concerns into the determination of personal jurisdic-
tion. See Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw. U. L. REv. 1112, 1113-14 (1981); see alro Abraham, supra note 26, at 532-33; Clermont,
supra note 8, at 446 n.161.
136 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
137 Id Commentators also have noted the inconsistency between an individual's waiver
of jurisdiction and the protection purportedly afforded the states by the due process clause.
See, e.g., Hill, Choice of Law andJurisdiction, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 960, 978 (1981).
138 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
139 Id. at 713 (footnote omitted).
140 Id at 713-14.
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State."14 1
The power requirement of the traditional composite test for per-
sonal jurisdiction 142 looks only to the relationship of the defendant to
the forum. Unless sufficient defendant-forum contacts exist, regardless
of the interests of the plaintiff and the forum state, a court cannot exer-
cise jurisdiction. If sufficient forum-defendant contacts are present, a
court, under the second component of the composite test, inquires into
the reasonableness of a jurisdictional finding.
Notions of state sovereignty underlie the power requirement of
fourteenth amendment due process, 43 which originally derived from
Pennoyer v. Nqf.14 The Court's rejection of sovereignty concerns in foot-
note 10 might suggest a total abandonment of the power requirement
and its absolute demand of forum-defendant contacts. Such a reading
of the Court's position would leave only a reasonableness standard with
which to judge a court's exercise of jurisdiction under the fourteenth
amendment. The Court's assertion, however, that its opinion "does not
alter the requirement that there be 'minimum contacts' between the
nonresident defendant and the forum State"'145 appears incompatible
with such an interpretation. Perhaps the Court is suggesting not that it
is abandoning the power requirement's absolute demand of forum-de-
fendant contacts, but that it is altering that requirement's theoretical
basis. 146 A dual power-reasonableness test may still be required, but the
power component of that test, rather than being based on notions of
state sovereignty, would now be based, like the reasonableness require-
ment, on "individual liberty interests."
Thus, under Compagnie des Bauxites, as in the past, 147 a court assess-
ing personal jurisdiction under the fourteenth amendment would first
check for sufficient forum-defendant contacts. If such contacts were
lacking, the court would dismiss the action. Such dismissal would be
necessary not because a finding of jurisdiction would offend state sover-
eignty, but because it would offend the defendant's "individual liberty
interests." The court would go on to examine the broader spectrum of
141 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
142 See supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text. See genera/( Hazard, A General Theoy of
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 262-81.
144 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
145 456 U.S. at 702 n.10.
146 If, contrary to this suggestion, footnote 10, in fact, indicates a willingness on the part
of the Court to abandon the power requirement of the fourteenth amendment, it could have a
substantial impact on the law of personal jurisdiction. The Court's discussion of fourteenth
amendment due process, however, may be significant even if one reads footnote 10 only to
suggest a disavowal of sovereignty concerns that underlie the power requirement. Any rejec-
tion of the concerns that form the foundation of the power requirement could eventually lead
to a rejection of the requirement itself and the fashioning of a new test for personal jurisdic-
tion. See infia notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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criteria analyzed under the reasonableness requirement only if forum-
defendant contacts were present.
3. An Opportunity to Redefine the Requirements of Personal Juridiction
Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Read literally, the fourteenth amendment due process clause man-
dates only that a state, and thus a state court in its exercise of jurisdic-
tion, not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."' 148 The Court has developed two bases on which to rest
its restrictions of personal jurisdiction under the du'e process clause: pro-
tection of state sovereignty and protection of the rights of the defendant,
or, using the terminology of Compagnie des Bauxites, the defendant's "in-
dividual liberty interests."' 49
Concerns of state sovereignty as portrayed in Pennoyer v. NeftS 0 gave
rise to the power requirement with its absolute demand for forum-de-
fendant contacts. 151 In Compagnie des Bauxites, however, the Court as-
serted that concerns of state sovereignty do not underlie due process
restrictions on personal jurisdiction. 52 Thus, the Court rejected the the-
oretical underpinnings of the power requirement and left only one justi-
fication for the regulation of personal jurisdiction under the due process
clause-individual liberty interests. 153
Eliminating sovereignty concerns as a basis of the due process re-
strictions on personal jurisdiction allows the Court to alter the four-
teenth amendment jurisdictional test. Any test is doctrinally acceptable,
provided it protects the individual liberty interests of the defendant and
is otherwise reasonable. The Court may eliminate the composite power-
reasonableness test and replace it with any test that adequately ensures
fairness to the defendant.
The power requirement's absolute demand that the defendant have
contact with the forum before a court may exercise jurisdiction may
help to ensure fairness and protect the defendant's "individual liberty
interests." Concerns of fairness and "individual liberty interests," how-
ever, do not necessarily require forum-defendant contacts in every exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction. Although the power requirement does
embody an element of fairness to the defendant by guaranteeing forum
contacts, a court may also achieve fairness under a more flexible stan-
dard. Fairness does not require unyielding adherence to forum-defend-
ant contacts. For example, in Compagnie des Bauxites, the Court found
148 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
149 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
150 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
151 See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
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the imposition of jurisdiction fair, even though it had no proof of forum-
defendant contacts.
The Court may ensure fairness to defendants through-a wide vari-
ety of tests that weigh numerous factors. A personal jurisdiction test
could measure the interests of the plaintiff in litigating in a particular
forum against the defendant's interest in litigating elsewhere. 154 A more
inclusive test would examine other factors, such as the interests of the
forum. 155 The reasonableness component of the present composite
power-reasonableness test exemplifies such a multifactor analysis.'5 6
Several commentators have favored more flexible tests' 5 7-- tests
that measure factors in addition to the defendant's contacts with the
forum-over the present composite test that requires examining forum-
defendant contacts as a first level of inquiry before examining the rea-
sonableness of the jurisdictional finding. It now appears that the stum-
bling block of sovereignty has been removed from the law of personal
jurisdiction. Thus, the Court 58 is free to reevaluate the doctrine of per-
sonal jurisdiction and adopt a test that most equitably and fairly deter-
mines the reach of state and federal courts.
154 The test would take into account the relationship of both parties to the forum. If, for
example, the plaintiff had no connection to the forum, the defendant's interest in being heard
in another forum probably would be stronger. Several commentators endorse similar ap-
proaches. See, e.g., Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185,
192-93 (1976); Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction." A Historical-Inter-
pretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 735, 843 (1981).
Any forum interests under a jurisdictional test that considers only plaintiff and defend-
ant interests could be accounted for under the full faith and credit clause by limiting freedom
in the selection of choice of law. See, e.g., Martin supra; Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The
End ofan Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 82 (1978).
155 Numerous commentators have recommended that personal jurisdiction tests consider
all interests-plaintiffs, defendant's, and forum's-in determining whether jurisdiction is
proper. See, e.g., Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction ofState Courts, 66
MICH. L. REv. 227, 230-31 (1967); Clermont, supra note 8, at 451-55; Jay, 'Minimum Contacts"
as a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429, 459-72 (1981);
McDougalJudicalurisdictior From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1, 17-45
(1982); Redish,supra note 135, at 1137-42; Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Persona/Jurisdiction after
Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 861, 890-98 (1978); Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson:
A Limit to the Expansion of Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 1981 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 628-31 (1981); Com-
ment, Federalism, Due Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1341, 1357-61 (1980); Developments, supra note 5 at 923-25.
156 See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). But see
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count. Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. Cr.
REV. 77 (1980).
157 See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
158 The Supreme Court will shortly hear other cases dealing with personal jurisdiction.
See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 682 F.2d 33 (lst Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 813
(1983); Calder v. Jones, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1982), prob. juris, noted, 103
S. Ct. 1766 (1983); Hall v. Helicopters De Columbia, 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982), cert. granted,
103 S. Ct. 1270 (1983).
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CONCLUSION
Compagnie des Bauxites, read narrowly, applies only to fifth amend-
ment due process. Nevertheless, the Court's failure to expressly restrict
its opinion to the fifth amendment suggests application to the fourteenth
amendment as well. The opinion, however, is inconsistent with four-
teenth amendment precedent. In particular, footnote 10, which ironi-
cally was written to rebut a seeming mistake in a concurrence, rejects
the notion that state sovereignty forms one of the bases of fourteenth
amendment jurisdictional due process. This rejection of state sover-
eignty calls into question over 100 years of precedent and provides the
Court an opportunity to redefine the law of personal jurisdiction.
Peter A. Diana &J Michael Register
